Mecca Agreement: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

🇸🇦🇹🇷🇵🇰 In August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement in Mecca. The agreement is designed, in a sense, to operate on the principle of NATO: an armed attack on any one of the three countries will be considered an attack on all participants.

The idea of an “Arab NATO” or “Islamic NATO” has been discussed for years, but previous initiatives never developed into full-fledged defense alliances. The current trilateral partnership emerged against the backdrop of the confrontation between the United States and Iran, but its stated goal is not war with Tehran.

Instead, the alliance is intended primarily as a deterrent mechanism aimed at discouraging other regional players from taking military action. Israel is among the countries watching the development closely.

🤝 The Mecca Agreement

On August 7, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Joint Defense Agreement, commonly known as the “Mecca Agreement” because the meeting took place in Mecca.

In a joint statement, the three leaders made clear that an armed attack on any one of the three countries will be considered an attack on all participants in the agreement.

📌 The agreement establishes a collective security commitment between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.

Under the alliance, a ministerial committee modeled on NATO will be established, along with a secretariat headquartered in Saudi Arabia.

The three countries also plan to hold joint military exercises, develop weapons and introduce various technologies. At the same time, the parties do not seek to replace any existing alliances, and their trilateral partnership does not require them to withdraw from other blocs or agreements.

The full text of the agreement has not yet been made public. Its details are known mainly through statements made by the participating countries.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan compared the agreement with Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which provided the legal foundation for NATO.

Fidan also said that the new alliance is not directed against Iran or any other country. According to him, it represents a joint commitment to ensure the security of the three allies.

No country will be considered a threat unless an attack is carried out against one of the member states. In such an event, the country under attack will have to request assistance and determine what kind of help is needed.

“Support could range from intelligence and logistical assistance to the supply of ammunition and, at a later stage, the deployment of military units.”

According to Fidan, the type of assistance would depend on the scale of the threat.

Notably, even after the signing of the “Mecca Agreement,” new attacks on Saudi Arabia by pro-Iranian forces did not lead Pakistan or Türkiye to announce any direct military intervention.

🌩️ Storm Clouds Over Saudi Arabia

On July 13, the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia after forces of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, backed by Riyadh, struck Sana’a airport to prevent a plane from Tehran from landing there.

Reuters later reported, citing four sources, that the plane was carrying commanders and advisers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as components for missiles and drones. Iran and the Houthis denied the claims.

According to Reuters, Tehran asked the Houthis to be prepared to block the oil route through the Red Sea in the event of further United States strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure.

On July 20, the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, followed by attacks on Saudi oil facilities toward the end of the month.

These developments threatened Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy export corridor through the Red Sea at a time when instability in the Strait of Hormuz had already disrupted traditional shipping routes used by Gulf states.

The Houthis are believed to have acted in coordination with Iraqi pro-Iranian groups under the supervision of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Some attacks against Saudi Arabia reportedly came from Iraqi territory.

The attacks continued into August, but there was no announcement that the collective defense mechanism had been invoked or that Pakistan or Türkiye would respond militarily. This was also the case after three Pakistani nationals were killed in a Houthi attack on a vessel in the Red Sea. Islamabad responded by strongly condemning the strike.

⚓ Saudi Arabia Builds a Wider Maritime Coalition

Saudi Arabia has also been active in building broader security partnerships.

On July 30, the kingdom announced the creation of the Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition to protect the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden.

Representatives of 43 countries and the European Union attended its first meeting, while 14 states endorsed the joint statement. By August 14, the number of signatories had increased to 15.

The coalition’s full list of participants has not been published, but media reports have named Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Bangladesh, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, the Comoros and Nigeria.

It is also known that the coalition will initially be commanded by a Saudi representative, with a Pakistani nominee serving as his deputy.

The coalition is envisioned as a defensive structure operating within the framework of the United Nations Charter and international maritime law. Its stated goal is to ensure freedom of navigation rather than to attack any particular state or organization.

Operationally, it envisages coordinated naval patrols, surveillance, intelligence sharing, joint operational planning and initiatives to strengthen military capabilities in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden.

🛡️ Participation in military operations remains a sovereign decision for each member state.

As with the trilateral pact, the emphasis appears to be on deterrence. It is no coincidence that NATO, of which Türkiye has been a member since 1952, is cited as a model.

According to Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan, NATO’s main deterrent capability is defensive in nature and is based on the message that an attack on the alliance would mean confronting a large military community.

📜 Not the First Attempt at an “Islamic NATO”

There have been repeated attempts to create an “Islamic NATO” or a narrower “Arab NATO.” The Arab League, for example, considered establishing joint armed forces, but such plans repeatedly foundered because of rivalries among member states and changing political circumstances.

The Baghdad Pact of 1955 was an anti-Soviet military and political alliance between Iraq, Türkiye, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, created at London’s initiative. It was more symbolic than a genuine military bloc and did not last long.

Iraq withdrew in 1959 following its revolution the previous year. The pact was subsequently renamed the Central Treaty Organization before eventually collapsing as a result of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

After the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the Arab monarchies, Egypt and Syria adopted the Damascus Declaration and sought to establish a more robust regional security system. The project did not survive disputes over funding and mutual distrust.

The Gulf Cooperation Council likewise failed to develop into a fully fledged joint defense alliance, although it still has joint military structures, including the Peninsula Shield Force, established in the 1980s.

Efforts to create a common defense system were repeatedly hampered by different perceptions of threats among Gulf states, particularly regarding Iran, as well as rivalry among the monarchies themselves.

The 2017 crisis was a particularly clear example. Three Gulf Cooperation Council members — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain — severed ties with Qatar.

⚔️ The Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen

A more practical example was the Saudi-led Arab coalition in Yemen, established in March 2015 to support the government of Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi against the Houthis.

Unlike many “Arab NATO” projects, the coalition actually conducted a years-long joint military campaign. However, it also had significant limitations.

• Pakistan refused to send the troops requested by Riyadh.
• Qatar was expelled from the coalition after the 2017 crisis.
• Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates developed increasingly divergent interests.

🇺🇸 Earlier US Attempts to Build a Regional Security System

Attempts to establish a regional security system also came from outside the region, primarily from the United States.

During the administration of Barack Obama, Washington discussed two competing proposals with regional states — the Saudi-backed “Islamic Forces” and the Egyptian “Arab Forces.” The United States also sought to expand the Arab League’s capacity for peacekeeping, stabilization and humanitarian operations.

Experts noted that the United States was interested in reducing its burden of providing security in the Middle East. However, disagreements among Arab states emerged from the outset.

“Who would lead whom and who would answer to whom?”

During Donald Trump’s first term, the proposal to create a Middle East Strategic Alliance was discussed. It was intended to include the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, plus Egypt and Jordan.

Containing Iran’s influence was one of its main objectives, but the project never developed into a fully fledged structure.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain took the toughest stance toward Tehran, while Qatar, Kuwait and Oman preferred to keep channels of communication open. Egypt and Jordan did not want the alliance to become a mechanism for military confrontation with Iran.

These differences were compounded by the Qatar crisis, a struggle over leadership and disputes regarding the proposed organization’s general operations.

🇸🇦🇹🇷🇵🇰 Why Three Countries May Be Different

The fact that the new “Mecca Agreement” consists of only three countries makes the alliance more flexible and potentially more sustainable.

Still, the partnership between Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia is hardly enough to justify calling it an “Arab NATO” — at least for now.

➕ 3+?

According to Hakan Fidan, the preferred model would see Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan retain their status as founding members responsible for developing the alliance’s principles, standards and long-term structure.

Other countries could potentially join with the approval of the core group of original members.

One of the first candidates is Egypt, which in March joined Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in a new consultation format at the foreign minister level known as R4.

The ministers have met four times in the months since then, an unusually high level of activity.

Against this backdrop, the signing of the agreement in Mecca led regional media to ask why Egypt had not joined the alliance.

Fidan maintains that the delay is merely technical.

Meanwhile, The Middle East Eye published a report claiming that Saudi Arabia had opposed Egypt joining the group, “at least for now.” Its sources attributed this to Riyadh’s growing dissatisfaction with the policies of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Saudi Arabia provided around $25 billion in support for the Egyptian economy after Sisi came to power and reportedly believes that Cairo has given little in return.

⚠️ Reported sources of tension include Egypt’s limited role in the fight against the Houthis and its position during the United States-Israeli war against Iran.

Another source of irritation is Egypt’s relationship with the United Arab Emirates.

During the Iranian attacks, Cairo sent air defense systems and fighter jets to the Emirates, while Sisi met repeatedly with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed.

No comparable steps were taken toward Saudi Arabia. According to sources cited by The Middle East Eye, this deepened Riyadh’s suspicions regarding Cairo’s alignment with Abu Dhabi.

This comes on top of the difficult relationship between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which came close to armed confrontation late last year.

At the same time, Egyptian sources claim that Cairo itself declined to join the “Saudi political bloc,” fearing that doing so would limit its autonomy on security and diplomatic matters.

Egypt is developing its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, which have disputes with Türkiye, as well as with India, Pakistan’s main regional rival. Cairo also has to balance its relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

🎯 Who Are They Banding Together Against?

Cairo, like many other regional players, naturally wants an answer to the question: who are the countries in this alliance banding together against?

The response that the new alliance has no specific adversary does little to resolve the issue.

The Soviet Union was likewise not named as an enemy in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. However, the historical context of NATO’s creation left little doubt that the alliance was formed primarily as a mechanism for deterring Soviet expansion in Europe.

There is no such clarity yet in the case of the Mecca Agreement.

Saudi Arabia is primarily focused on Iran and proxy forces aligned with Tehran. For Pakistan, India remains its main traditional rival.

Türkiye is increasingly speaking about threats stemming from Israel’s growing strength.

📌 Potential members and observers are therefore trying to understand not only which adversaries the agreement is formally not directed against, but also which threats the three countries actually regard as common.

“One of the conditions for the success of any alliance is identifying a common enemy. So who is the enemy for the countries in this alliance?”

Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdallah raised this question.

Voices from Abu Dhabi are particularly important. Throughout the latest war with Iran, the United Arab Emirates consistently called on the Gulf monarchies to coordinate more closely on security.

“We have no alternative but to unite our ranks.”

UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash made this appeal in July.

Yet Abu Dhabi has so far found itself on the sidelines of the new structures that have emerged around Riyadh this summer. The United Arab Emirates was not even among the 14 states that signed the declaration establishing the Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition on July 30.

Against the backdrop of tensions between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, this is hardly surprising.

🇮🇱 A Possible Counterweight to the Abraham Accords

More broadly, the “Mecca Agreement” is beginning to look like a counterweight to the Abraham Accords — the series of agreements brokered by Donald Trump between Muslim countries and Israel to normalize relations.

In 2020, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were the first countries to join the Abraham Accords, followed by Morocco and Sudan.

The accords were not defense treaties and were primarily aimed at normalizing diplomatic and economic relations. However, security cooperation was an important component from the outset.

The Trump administration viewed the process as part of a broader restructuring of the region’s security architecture, including against the backdrop of its confrontation with Iran.

In this context, Washington placed particular emphasis on normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

In the fall of 2023, Israel and Saudi Arabia were close to reaching an agreement. However, Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israeli territory, followed by the war in the Gaza Strip and later in Lebanon, dramatically altered the regional balance of power.

Riyadh abandoned its rapprochement with Israel, making its willingness to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians and accept the establishment of a Palestinian state a condition for further negotiations.

The shift was predictable, and Hamas had counted on such an outcome. One of the objectives of the October 7 attack was to derail the Saudi-Israeli normalization process.

⚠️ It is therefore not surprising that Israel is wary of Riyadh’s rapprochement with Ankara and Islamabad, both of which have strained relations with Jerusalem.

Gallia Lindenstrauss, a senior researcher at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, described the development as a worrying one from Israel’s perspective.

“From Israel’s perspective, this is a very worrying development.”

According to Lindenstrauss, the agreement adds a military component to a political front that demonstrates a strongly anti-Israeli position. She also noted that both Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are potentially exploring nuclear capabilities and could gain significantly from close defense cooperation with Pakistan.

At the same time, she believes that the door to normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia has not closed, even if the chances of such a deal have diminished.

Yoel Guzansky, a former National Security Council official and head of the Gulf Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, described the trilateral alliance as not being a military alliance against Israel but as having an anti-Israeli orientation.

“It is not a military alliance against Israel, but it is anti-Israeli in its orientation.”

He added that Türkiye and Pakistan have strongly critical positions toward Israel and suggested that Saudi Arabia joining such an alliance could lead it to distance itself from Israel and, under pressure from its partners, adopt a more confrontational policy.

🕰️ The Agreement Began Before the Current Regional Crisis

It is important to note that the three countries began working on a joint defense agreement in December 2023, just two months after the Hamas attack on Israel and the outbreak of the war.

Even then, the Iranian factor was already present. Tehran was widely accused of encouraging Hamas and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah.

However, there had not yet been an open military confrontation between Israel and Iran, let alone between the United States and Iran.

Bashar al-Assad was still in power in Syria, and the regional balance looked very different.

By the time the agreement was signed, after two years and eight months of negotiations, the war in the region had already affected dozens of countries, either directly or through economic consequences.

During that period, the balance of power shifted repeatedly. Yet the fundamental question remained: who will shape the future of the Middle East?

🇮🇷 Iran's Reaction to the New Alliance

At the same time, Tehran reacted to the new regional alliance in broadly positive terms, or at least sought to give that impression.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said that there was no reason to worry that the pact was directed against Iran.

“There is no reason to worry that the pact is directed against Iran.”

According to Baghaei, the agreement instead shows that the three countries have concluded that they cannot rely entirely on United States security commitments.

Iran has also sought to convince Gulf monarchies and other Arab countries that the American presence in the region does not necessarily strengthen their security and defense.

Iran specialist Vali Nasr, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, argued that Tehran welcomes the “Mecca Agreement” because it means the United States has to compete with other security structures in the Gulf in order to remain relevant.

In his view, even if the new alliance cannot yet be considered a full-fledged military pact, its emergence demonstrates the extent to which doubts about the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor have become a serious regional concern.

🇺🇸 Not Instead of the United States

As a result of the war with Iran, which saw the United States effectively leave the Gulf monarchies exposed to attacks by Tehran and its proxies, the Middle East no longer regards Washington as an unquestioned security guarantor.

However, similar disillusionment had emerged earlier. One example was the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2019, which drew only a muted response from Washington.

In recent years, regional players have increasingly come to believe that they need backup options.

Even before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this included exploring partnerships with Moscow and joining or moving closer to organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, where Beijing also plays a significant role.

Another form of insurance is the search for transregional alliances, such as the partnership between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

On the other side are Israel, India and the United Arab Emirates. However, all six countries are tied together by their partnerships with the United States, which they ultimately have no intention of abandoning.

🇺🇸 Washington Welcomes the New Alliance

Notably, Washington itself welcomed the emergence of the new alliance.

US President Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social that the development showed how the Middle East was coming together and how countries would finally be able to defend themselves more effectively.

“This shows how the Middle East is coming together and how countries will finally be able to defend themselves more effectively. Congratulations to the great leadership of the three countries mentioned. This is a big, bold, and important first step.”

In effect, this is consistent with US hopes of shifting part of the burden of regional security onto the shoulders of its partners where possible.

At the same time, Washington will neither be able nor willing to withdraw completely from the Middle East.

It is no coincidence that Trump has posted images depicting the Strait of Hormuz as US territory.

🌍 A New Middle Eastern Security Order?

The process is far from over. The regional order that took decades to build — who is allied with whom and who is at war with whom — has been disrupted.

The “Mecca Agreement” represents another attempt to create a regional security structure based on cooperation between states with different interests but overlapping security concerns.

For now, it remains unclear whether the trilateral partnership will develop into a broader military alliance or remain primarily a mechanism for political coordination and deterrence.

📌 The central question is no longer simply whether a new “Islamic NATO” will emerge, but who will shape the new security architecture of the Middle East.